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1 Introduction
This study develops a Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous entry of heterogeneous
rms to analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth. The canonical Schum-
peterian growth model in seminal studies such as Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and
Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) features an identical step size of quality
improvements across rms. In this study, we consider a Schumpeterian model with random
quality improvements as in Minniti et al. (2013) but with the addition of a xed entry
cost to generate endogenous entry of rms with heterogeneous step sizes of quality improve-
ments. To incorporate money demand into this growth-theoretic framework, we impose a
cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint on R&D investment. Berentsen et al. (2012), Chu and
Cozzi (2014) and Chu et al. (2015) provide extensive discussion on evidence for the presence
of cash requirements on R&D expenditures.1 We capture these cash requirements using a
CIA constraint on R&D.
In this monetary growth-theoretic framework, we derive the following results. In the
special case of a zero entry cost, an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D,
the arrival rate of innovations and economic growth as in previous studies, such as Chu and
Cozzi (2014) who consider a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with an identical step
size of quality improvements, because the distribution of innovations that are implemented
is exogenous under a zero entry cost despite random quality improvements. However, in the
general case of a positive entry cost, monetary policy a¤ects the distribution of innovations
that are implemented. Specically, an increase in the nominal interest rate decreases R&D
and the arrival rate of innovations, which increases the present value of future prots. The
resulting higher value of inventions leads to a lower threshold of quality improvements above
which an innovation is implemented generating a positive e¤ect on economic growth due
to more entries. Together with the negative e¤ect on the arrival rate of innovations, an
increase in the nominal interest rate would have an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth if
the entry cost is su¢ ciently large. Because the Fisher equation gives rise to a positive long-
run relationship between the nominal interest rate and the ination rate that is supported
by empirical studies such as Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001), our result also
implies an inverted-U relationship between ination and economic growth. This theoretical
prediction on an inverted-U relationship between ination and economic growth is supported
by empirical studies such as Bick (2010) and López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011). We
calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a quantitative analysis
and nd that the growth-maximizing ination rate is 2.9%, which is close to the empirical
estimate in López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) who identify a threshold ination rate of
2.7% for industrialized countries.
1For example, early empirical studies such as Hall (1992) and Opler et al. (1999) nd a positive and
signicant relationship between R&D and cash ows in US rms. More recently, Bates et al. (2009)
document that the average cash-to-assets ratio in US rms increased substantially from 1980 to 2006 and
argue that this is partly driven by their rising R&D expenditures. Brown and Petersen (2011) provide
evidence that rms smooth R&D expenditures by maintaining a bu¤er stock of liquidity in the form of cash
reserves. Falato and Sim (2014) use rm-level data in the US to show that rmscash holdings increase
(decrease) signicantly in response to a rise (cut) in R&D tax credits. These results suggest that due to
nancial frictions, rms need to use cash to nance their R&D investment.
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We also simulate the welfare e¤ects of ination and nd that the relationship between
ination and social welfare is positive. Intuitively, an increase in the nominal interest rate
reduces the threshold of quality improvement (and equivalently markup) for entries. The
resulting decrease in the overall price level of monopolistic intermediate goods stimulates
the demand for them and increases the production of nal good. The increase in output
leads to more consumption, which represents a positive welfare e¤ect, and this positive e¤ect
dominates other welfare e¤ects of ination under our calibrated parameter values.
Furthermore, we consider two extensions to the benchmark model. Our model with a
Pareto distribution of random quality improvements and a Cobb-Douglas aggregator implies
that some of the monopolistic prices can be arbitrarily large, which is empirically unrealistic.
Therefore, we generalize our benchmark model by imposing an upper bound on equilibrium
prices. In this case, we nd that if the upper bound on equilibrium prices is su¢ ciently large,
then our model would still feature an inverted-U e¤ect of ination on growth. As for the
simulated welfare e¤ects of ination, they remain positive under our calibrated parameter
values. Finally, given that our benchmark model features inelastic labor supply, we consider
another extension by allowing for elastic labor supply and a CIA constraint on consumption.
In this case, we nd that the welfare e¤ects of ination are sensitive to the strength of the
CIA constraint on consumption.
This study relates to the literature on innovation and economic growth. The R&D-
based growth model originates from Romer (1990), who develops a variety-expanding growth
model in which economic growth is driven by the development of new products. Then,
Segerstrom et al. (1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
develop the Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model in which economic growth is driven
by the quality improvement of existing products. For simplicity, these studies assume an
identical step size for all quality improvements. A recent study by Minniti et al. (2013)
generalizes the Schumpeterian model by allowing for heterogeneous step sizes of quality
improvements that are randomly drawn from a Pareto distribution. Our study extends the
elegant framework of Minniti et al. (2013) by introducing a xed entry cost of implementing
a developed invention in order to generate endogenous entries of heterogeneous rms,2 which
turn out to have important implications on the e¤ects of monetary policy. Recently, Iwaisako
and Ohki (2017) also consider a quality-ladder model with random quality improvements,
and they consider a uniform distribution with an upper bound on the prots of monopolistic
rms.
This study also relates to the literature on ination and innovation. In this literature,
Marquis and Re¤ett (1994) is the seminal study that analyzes the e¤ects of ination on
innovation in the Romer variety-expanding growth model. In contrast, we analyze the ef-
fects of ination in a Schumpeterian quality-ladder model as in Chu and Lai (2013), Chu
and Cozzi (2014), Chu et al. (2015), He and Zou (2016), Huang et al. (2017) and Neto
et al. (2017), whose models however feature an identical step size of quality improvements
across rms. Chu and Ji (2016) and Huang et al. (2015) consider monetary policy in a
Schumpeterian growth model with both variety expansion and (identical) quality accumu-
2See also Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2008), Haruyama and Zhao (2008) and Gustafsson and Segerstrom
(2010) who adapt this xed entry cost into the R&D-based growth model, but they do not consider random
increments on the quality ladder.
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lation across rms. Arawatari et al. (2016) and Hori (2017) consider monetary policy in
the Romer variety-expanding model with heterogeneity in the productivity of R&D entre-
preneurs. As in Marquis and Re¤ett (1994), these studies predict a monotonic relationship
between ination and economic growth.3 The present study contributes to this literature by
allowing for the endogenous entry of rms with heterogeneous step sizes of quality improve-
ments, which gives rise to a novel channel through which monetary policy a¤ects innovation
and growth. As a result, the model generates an inverted-U relationship between ination
and economic growth, which is supported by recent empirical studies.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and solves the model.
Section 3 analyzes the growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. Section 4 considers a
number of extensions to the benchmark model. The nal section concludes.
2 A Schumpeterian model with heterogeneous rms
The Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model is based on Grossman and Helpman (1991).
We extend their model by (a) introducing money demand via a CIA constraint on R&D to
analyze monetary policy, (b) considering lab-equipment innovation and entry processes that
use nal good (instead of labor) as the input, (c) allowing for random quality improvements
as in Minniti et al. (2013), and (d) incorporating a xed entry cost to generate endogenous
entry of heterogeneous rms as in Melitz (2003). In summary, when a rm invents a higher
quality product, the step size of the quality increment is randomly drawn from a Pareto
distribution. If and only if the quality increment is su¢ ciently large, then the rm would
pay the xed entry cost to implement the invention and enter the market.
2.1 Household
In the economy, there is a representative household which has the following lifetime utility
function:
U =
Z 1
0
e t ln ctdt, (1)
where the parameter  > 0 is the subjective discount rate and ct denotes consumption of
nal good (numeraire) at time t. The household maximizes utility subject to an asset-
accumulation equation (expressed in real terms) given by
_at + _mt = rtat   tmt + itbt + wt +  t   ct. (2)
at is the real value of nancial assets (in the form of equity shares in monopolistic intermediate
goods rms) owned by the household. rt is the real interest rate. t is the ination rate. mt is
the real money balance accumulated by the household. bt is the amount of money borrowed
by R&D entrepreneurs subject to the following constraint: bt  mt. it is the interest rate on
money bt borrowed by R&D entrepreneurs, and it can be shown as a no-arbitrage condition
3The relationship between the two variables is usually found to be monotonically negative, but some of
these studies also nd that the relationship can be monotonically positive under some conditions.
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that it must be equal to the nominal interest rate such that it = rt + t from the Fisher
equation. To earn the wage rate wt, the household inelastically supplies one unit of labor.4
 t is a lump-sum transfer from the government to the household. From standard dynamic
optimization, the familiar Euler equation is
_ct
ct
= rt   . (3)
2.2 Final good
Final good is produced by perfectly competitive rms that employ labor and a composite of
intermediate goods as inputs. The production function of nal good is Yt = LtK
1 
t , where
Lt = 1 is labor input. Kt is a composite of intermediate goods produced with the following
Cobb-Douglas aggregator:
Kt = exp
(Z 1
0
ln
"X
j
qt(!; j)yt(!; j)
#
d!
)
, (4)
where the integer j in qt(!; j) denotes the quality vintage of intermediate good !. Let j!
denotes the highest-quality vintage in industry !. Firms are indi¤erent between the highest-
quality vintage and the second-highest-quality vintage if their relative price is
pt(!; j!)
pt(!; j!   1) =
qt(!; j!)
qt(!; j!   1)  t(!), (5)
where t(!) > 1 is the quality increment between the two consecutive vintages of interme-
diate good ! at time t. As usual, whenever this equality holds, we focus on the case in
which rms buy the highest-quality intermediate good only. In equilibrium, only the highest
quality intermediate goods are traded. From prot maximization, the conditional demand
function for intermediate good ! is given by
yt(!; j!) =
(1  )Yt
pt(!; j!)
=
(1  )K1 t
pt(!; j!)
. (6)
Multiplying qt(!; j!) to both sides of (6) and then aggregating the natural log of the resulting
equation with respect to !, we derive
Kt = [(1  )Qt=Pt]1= , (7)
where Qt  exp
hR 1
0
ln qt(!; j!)d!
i
and Pt  exp
hR 1
0
ln pt(!; j!)d!
i
denote respectively the
aggregate quality index and the aggregate price index of intermediate goods.
4Given that our model is already quite complex, we normalize the aggregate supply of labor to unity in
order to sidestep the issue of scale e¤ects; see for example, Peretto (1998, 2007) and Segerstrom (1998) for
important ways of removing the strong scale e¤ect in the Schumpeterian growth model. In the conclusion,
we discuss implications of scale e¤ects in our model.
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2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a unit continuum of industries ! 2 [0; 1] producing di¤erentiated intermediate
goods. Each industry is temporarily dominated by a quality leader until the arrival and
implementation of the next higher-quality product. The owner of the new innovation becomes
the next quality leader.5 The current quality leader in industry ! uses one unit of nal good
to produce one unit of intermediate good yt(!; j!), so that the marginal cost of production
is one. From Bertrand competition,6 limit pricing yields the equilibrium price given by
pt(!; j!) = t(!). (8)
Therefore, the amount of monopolistic prot in industry ! is
t(!; j!) = [t(!)  1] yt(!; j!) =

t(!)  1
t(!)

(1  )Yt, (9)
where the second equality uses (6) and (8).
2.4 R&D
R&D is performed by a unit continuum of competitive entrepreneurs. If an R&D entrepre-
neur employs Rt(!) units of nal good to engage in innovation in industry !, then she is
successful in inventing the next higher-quality product in the industry with an instantaneous
probability given by
t(!) = Rt(!)=t, (10)
where t  Q(1 )=t inversely measures R&D productivity and is proportional to Q(1 )=t
to ensure balanced growth. To facilitate the payment of Rt(!), the entrepreneur needs to
borrow cash from the household, and the cost of borrowing is determined by the nominal
interest rate it. Therefore, the cost of R&D is (1 + it)Rt(!). Let vet (!; j! + 1) denotes the
expected value of an innovation before the realization of its quality increment. Then, the
R&D free-entry condition is given by
vet (!; j! + 1)t(!) = (1 + it)Rt(!), vet (!; j! + 1)=t = 1 + it. (11)
2.5 Random quality improvements
As in Minniti et al. (2013), when an R&D entrepreneur invents a higher-quality product in
industry !, the quality increment t(!) > 1 is drawn from a stationary Pareto distribution
with the following probability density function:
f() =
1

 
1+
 , (12)
5This is known as the Arrow replacement e¤ect; see Cozzi (2007) for a discussion of the Arrow e¤ect.
6See Denicolò and Zanchettin (2010) for an analysis of Cournot competition in the Schumpeterian model.
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where the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines the shape of the Pareto distribution. Given
that the expected value of t(!) is equal across industries, (9) implies that the expected
value of t(!; j!) is also the same across industries. Therefore, we will follow the standard
treatment in the literature to focus on the symmetric equilibrium in which the arrival rate
of innovations is equal across industries,7 such that t(!) = t for ! 2 [0; 1].
2.6 Endogenous rm entry
To generate an endogenous distribution of heterogeneous rms, we follow Melitz (2003) and
others to consider a xed entry cost. The entry cost is given by t  Q(1 )=t ,8 which
is proportional to Q(1 )=t to ensure balanced growth. Given the entry cost, a rm enters
the market if and only if vt()  t, where vt () denotes the ex post value of an innovation
(i.e., after the realization of the quality increment ).9 vt () is monotonically increasing in 
because t() = (1 )Yt( 1)= is increasing in . Given that vt(1) = 0 and vt()=Q(1 )=t
is stationary in equilibrium, it can be shown that there exists a stationary threshold value
of ,10 denoted as ~, above which rms implement their innovations and enter the market
generating endogenous entry of rms with heterogeneous quality improvements.
2.7 Asset prices
The ex-ante value of an innovation (i.e., before the realization of ) is formally dened as
vet (!; j! + 1) =
Z ~
1
0  f()d+
Z 1
~
[vt()  t]f()d =
Z 1
~
vt()f()d  Pr(  ~)t,
where Pr(  ~) denotes the probability of the innovation being implementable. In the
symmetric equilibrium with vet (!; j! + 1)  vet , the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-ante
value of innovation can be derived as11
rt =
et + _v
e
t + Pr(  ~) _t   Pr(  ~)t
h
vet + Pr(  ~)t
i
vet + Pr(  ~)t
, (13)
7Cozzi et al. (2007) provide a theoretical justication for the symmetric equilibrium to be the unique
rational-expectation equilibrium in the Schumpeterian model.
8We do not impose a CIA constraint on entry for the following reasons. Unlike R&D investment that
is subject to uncertainty in innovation success, the entry cost is incurred after an innovation is already
developed and patented. Therefore, banks should be available to extend credits to the rm, which can use
the patent as a collateral.
9In a symmetric equilibrium with t(!) = t, the value of innovations does not depend on !.
10See Appendix A for the proof.
11See Appendix A for the proof. To be more precise, we should refer to (13) as the no-arbitrage condition
for the expected value of an implemented innovation; i.e.,
R1
~
vt()f()d.
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where t is the arrival rate of innovation. Pr(  ~)t is the instantaneous probability that
an innovation is created and implemented in an industry. The Pareto probability density
function implies that
Pr(  ~) =
Z 1
~
f()d = ~
 1=
. (14)
Substituting (14) into (13) and rearranging terms yield
et
vet + ~
 1=
t
= rt + ~
 1=
t  
_vet +
~
 1= _t
vet + ~
 1=
t
, (15)
where the ex-ante value of monopolistic prots can be shown to be
et =
Z 1
~

  1


f()d

(1  )Yt =
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

#
(1  )Yt. (16)
Similarly, the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-post value of an innovation with   ~ is
t()
vt()
= rt + ~
 1=
t  
_vt()
vt()
, (17)
where the ex-post value of monopolistic prots with   ~ is given by
t() =

  1


(1  )Yt. (18)
2.8 Monetary authority
The monetary policy instrument that we consider is the nominal interest rate it, which is
exogenously set by the monetary authority. Given it, the ination rate t is endogenously
determined according to the Fisher equation such that t = it   rt, where rt is the real
interest rate and determined from the Euler equation in (3). Then, the growth rate of the
nominal money supply is given by t = t + _mt=mt, which becomes  = i    on the
balanced growth path.12 Finally, the monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue as
a lump-sum transfer  t = _mt + tmt to the household.
12It is useful to note that in this model, it is the growth rate of the money supply that a¤ects the real
economy in the long run, and a one-time change in the level of money supply has no long-run e¤ect on
the real economy. This is the well-known distinction between the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
Empirical evidence generally favors neutrality and rejects superneutrality, consistent with our model; see
Fisher and Seater (1993) for a discussion on the neutrality and superneutrality of money.
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2.9 Dynamics
This section characterizes the dynamics of the model. Lemma 1 shows that given a constant
nominal interest rate i, the economy immediately jumps to a balanced growth path. On this
balanced growth path, each variable grows at a constant (possibly zero) growth rate.
Lemma 1 The economy jumps to a unique and saddle-point stable balanced growth path.
Proof. See Appendix B.
2.10 Economic growth
Recall that the (log of) aggregate quality index is lnQt 
R 1
0
ln qt(!; j!)d!. In industry !; the
quality qt(!; j!) jumps to qt(!; j!+1) = (!)qt(!; j!) with probability Pr(  ~) = ~ 1=.
The continuum of industries shares this random process of quality improvements. Therefore,
the time derivative of lnQt is given by
_Qt
Qt
=
Z 1
0
[ln qt(!; j! + 1)  ln qt(!; j!)] d!

~
 1=
 =
Z 1
0
ln(!)d!

~
 1=
. (19)
Using the law of large numbers, we obtain13
_Qt
Qt
=
Z 1
~
(ln) ~f()d

~
 1=
 = (ln ~+ )~
 1=
, (20)
where ln ~+ captures the average step size of implemented quality improvements and ~f()
is dened as
~f()  f()R1
~
f()d
= ~
1
f().
Finally, the growth rate of output Yt and consumption ct is equal to
g =
1  

_Qt
Qt
=
1  

(ln ~+ )~
 1=
. (21)
Equation (21) shows that the equilibrium growth rate depends on two endogenous vari-
ables, the arrival rate  of innovations and the threshold step size ~. We can determine 
using the R&D condition vet = (1 + i)Q
(1 )=
t , where the balanced-growth value of v
e
t is
given by vet = 
e
t=( +
~
 1=
)   ~ 1=Q(1 )=t using (15) and the Euler equation. Then,
substituting (16) into the R&D condition, we obtain
(1  )
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

#
Yt
Q
(1 )=
t
=
h
(1 + i) + ~
 1=

i
(+ ~
 1=
). (22)
13Derivations are available in an unpublished appendix; see Appendix C.
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In Appendix B, we show that the production function of nal good can be expressed as
Yt =

1  
~e
(1 )=
Q
(1 )=
t . (23)
Similarly, we can determine ~ using the entry condition vt(~) = Q
(1 )=
t , where the
balanced-growth value of vt(~) is given by vt(~) = t(~)=( + ~
 1=
) using (17) and the
Euler equation. Then, substituting (18) into the entry condition, we obtain
(1  )
 
~  1
~
!
Yt
Q
(1 )=
t
= (+ ~
 1=
). (24)
Combining (22) and (24), we have the ~ condition given by
(~  1)~1= = 1
1 + i



1 + 
, (25)
where the left-hand side is increasing in ~. Therefore, (25) implicitly determines the unique
equilibrium value of ~. Using (23)-(25), we obtain the  condition given by
 =
~
 1=
1 + i

1 + 
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
  ~1=. (26)
Given ~ from (25), equation (26) determines the unique equilibrium value of .
3 Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and social
welfare. In Section 3.1, we analytically derive the e¤ects of the nominal interest rate on
economic growth. In Section 3.2, we calibrate the model to quantify the relationship between
ination and growth and the relationship between ination and welfare.
3.1 Qualitative analysis
Here we rst derive the e¤ects of increasing the nominal interest rate i on the innovation-
arrival rate  and the threshold step size ~. Lemma 2 shows that  is decreasing in i for
a given ~. Lemma 3 shows that ~ is decreasing in i. The intuition can be explained as
follows. An increase in the nominal interest rate i increases the cost of R&D and reduces the
incentives for innovation; as a result, the innovation rate  decreases for a given ~. From the
balanced-growth version of (15), we have vet = 
e
t=(+
~
 1=
) ~ 1=Q(1 )=t , which shows
that the decrease in , by reducing creative destruction, increases the present value of the
prot stream generated by implementing an innovation. This induces the implementation of
innovations associated with smaller prot margins, thereby reducing the threshold markup
~ for entry.
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Lemma 2 For a given ~, the innovation rate  is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i.
Proof. Use (26).
Lemma 3 The threshold step size ~ is decreasing in the nominal interest rate i.
Proof. Use (25).
When the entry cost t is zero, the nominal interest rate has no e¤ect on the distribution
of innovations that are implemented because all rms enter the market regardless of the size
of quality increments. In this case, ~ = 1, and g = 1 

 is monotonically decreasing in i via
. This result is the same as in Chu and Cozzi (2014), who consider a Schumpeterian growth
model with an identical step size of quality improvements across rms. However, when the
entry cost t is positive, the nominal interest rate i a¤ects both ~ and . In this case,
Pr(  ~) = ~ 1= is increasing in i. In other words, an increase in the nominal interest rate
reduces the threshold value ~ for entry and leads to more innovations being implemented.
When the entry cost t is su¢ ciently large, the overall e¤ects of i on the composite innovation
rate ~
 1=
 and the equilibrium growth rate g = 1 

(ln ~+)~
 1=
 become non-monotonic.
Specically, we nd that when the nominal interest rate i increases, ~
 1=
 and g rst increase
and eventually decrease. We summarize these results in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 If the entry cost is su¢ ciently large (small), an increase in the nominal
interest rate has an inverted-U (negative) e¤ect on the composite innovation rate ~
 1=
 and
the equilibrium growth rate g
Proof. See the Appendix B.
Before we conclude this section, we explore the relationship between ination and eco-
nomic growth. The Fisher equation gives rise to a positive long-run relationship between
the ination rate and the nominal interest rate that is supported by empirical studies such
as Mishkin (1992) and Booth and Ciner (2001). In our model, the ination rate is given by
the Fisher equation  = i r = i g(i) , where the second equality follows from the Euler
equation. Therefore, so long as @g(i)=@i < 1, we have @=@i = 1   @g(i)=@i > 0.14 Given
this positive relationship, ination and economic growth would also exhibit an inverted-
U relationship. Recent empirical studies such as Bick (2010) and López-Villavicencio and
Mignon (2011) provide evidence that supports an inverted-U relationship between ination
and economic growth.
14Under our calibrated parameter values, steady-state ination is increasing in the nominal interest rate.
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3.2 Quantitative analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a
quantitative illustration on the growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. The model
features the following structural parameters f; ; ; ; g and policy variable i. For the
discount rate, we set  to a standard value of 0.05. For the labor share, we set  to a value
of 0.59; see Elsby et al. (2013) who document that the labor share in the US has fallen to
less than 0.60 recently. According to the Conference Board Total Economy Database, the
average growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) in the US is about 0.6% from 1990 to
2014. We calibrate the R&D cost parameter  by targeting the scenario in which domestic
innovation drives half of the TFP growth in the US (i.e., g = 0:3%).15 For the cost of entry,
we calibrate  by setting the time between arrivals of innovation 1= to about 3 years as
in Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). For the Pareto distribution parameter, we follow Minniti
et al. (2013) to consider  = 0:21 as our benchmark, but we also explore another value
 = 0:16 that has interesting implications. Finally, we calibrate the value of i by targeting
the average ination rate  in the US, which is about 2.5% in the past two decades. The
parameter and variable values are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibration
Targets r wL=Y g  
0.053 0.590 0.003 0.338 0.025
Parameters      i
0.210 0.050 0.590 0.0013 1.1249 0.078
0.160 0.050 0.590 0.0023 1.0951 0.078
To explore the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy, we need to derive an expression for
social welfare. Given that the economy is always on a balanced growth path, we impose
balanced growth on (1) to derive the steady-state welfare function as
U =
1


ln c0 +
g


, (27)
where c0 is the balanced-growth level of consumption at time 0.16 We know that nal good
Yt is used for consumption ct, production of intermediate goods Xmt , R&D X
r
t and entry
Xet .
17 Using the market-clearing condition Yt = ct + Xmt + X
r
t + X
e
t and normalizing the
initial quality index Q0 to unity, we derive c0 as
c0 =

1  1  
(1 + ) ~

1  
~e
(1 )=
    ~ 1=. (28)
Under our benchmark parameter values, we nd that economic growth is an inverted-
U function of the nominal interest rate. In Figures 1a and 2a, we plot the equilibrium
15See Chu (2010) who nds that domestic R&D drives less than half of the TFP growth in the US.
16Here we dene time 0 as the instant when the economy jumps to the new balanced growth path as a
result of any policy change.
17See equations (B3)-(B5) for the denitions.
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growth rate g against the ination rate , which is monotonically increasing in the nomi-
nal interest rate i. Figure 1a presents our benchmark result and shows that the relation-
ship between economic growth and ination follows an inverted-U shape. Furthermore, the
growth-maximizing ination rate is about 2.9%, which is close to the empirical estimate
in López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011) who nd a threshold ination rate of 2.7% for
industrialized countries. As for the welfare e¤ect of ination, we nd that social welfare is
increasing in the ination rate. We report this result in Figure 1b, in which the welfare
e¤ects are expressed in the usual equivalent variations in consumption. The intuition can be
explained as follows. An increase in the nominal interest rate decreases the entry threshold ~,
which in turn reduces the average markup and the overall price level P = ~e.18 This lower
price level increases the demand for intermediate goods and the production of nal good
Y0 =
h
(1  )=(~e)
i(1 )=
, which in turn increases the initial level of consumption c0. Al-
though the growth e¤ect is non-monotonic, the positive consumption-level e¤ect dominates
in this case. Therefore, our model with endogenous entry generates a positive relationship
between ination and welfare over a wide range of parameter values.
Figure 1a: Ination and economic growth
( = 0:21)
Figure 1b: Ination and social welfare
( = 0:21)
In the empirical literature, studies sometime nd a monotonically negative e¤ect of in-
ation on economic growth; see for example, Guerrero (2006) and Vaona (2012). Indeed,
we nd that our model is exible enough to deliver a negative relationship between ination
and economic growth under reasonable parameter values. When we decrease the value of
 to 0.16 and recalibrate the rest of the parameters, we nd that the relationship between
economic growth and ination becomes monotonically negative. In this case, the smaller
value of  implies a smaller ratio of =, such that the negative growth e¤ect of ination
dominates the positive growth e¤ect. Although the growth e¤ect of ination becomes neg-
ative, the welfare e¤ect of ination remains positive over a wide range of parameter values
due to the increase in the initial level of output and consumption.
18See equation (B1).
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Figure 2a: Ination and economic growth
( = 0:16)
Figure 2b: Ination and social welfare
( = 0:16)
4 Extensions
In this section, we explore two extensions of our benchmark model.19 First, our model
implies that some prices of intermediate goods can be arbitrarily high due to the Pareto
distribution. Therefore, we modify the model by imposing an upper bound on equilibrium
prices. Second, our model features inelastic labor supply, under which ination does not
cause a consumption-leisure tradeo¤ that is commonly discussed in monetary growth models.
Therefore, we modify the benchmark model by allowing for elastic labor supply and imposing
also a CIA constraint on consumption.
4.1 Upper bound on monopolistic prices
In this section, we follow Evans et al. (2003) to impose an upper bound  on the monopolistic
prices of intermediate goods.20 In this case, the prices of intermediate goods are given by
pt(!; j!) = minft(!); g. (29)
In the following derivations, we present the changes caused by the introduction of upper
bound  and show that our inverted-U relationship between ination and growth can still
hold. Given , monopolistic prots become
t(!; j!) = min

t(!)  1
t(!)
;
  1


(1  )Yt. (30)
19We would like to thank the referees for these suggestions.
20Alternatively, one can impose an upper bound on equilibrium prices by following (a) Minniti et al.
(2013) to replace the Cobb-Douglas aggregator in (4) by a CES aggregator or (b) Iwaisako and Ohki (2017)
to impose an upper bound on the support of the distribution. For simplicity, we use the approach in Evans
et al. (2003) to cosider price regulation that imposes an upper bound directly on monopolistic prices.
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Accordingly, the ex-ante and ex-post equilibrium prots in (16) and (18) become21
et =
" 
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

!
 


1 + 
1

1+

#
(1  )Yt (31)
and
t () = min

  1

;
  1


(1  )Yt. (32)
We follow the same procedures as in Appendix A to derive the revised ~ condition in (25)
as follows:
~
1=
(~  1) = 1
1 + i

1 + 


241  ~

! 1+

35 . (33)
Equation (33) uniquely determines the equilibrium value of ~ as a function of i. From (7),
(8), (17), (32) and (33), we can derive the revised  condition in (26) as follows:
 =
~
 1=
1 + i

1 + 
(1  )1=
[e(1 )=]1 (
~=)
1=
241  ~

! 1+

35  ~1=. (34)
Given the equilibrium value of ~ from (33), equation (34) determines the unique equilibrium
value of , analogous to (25) and (26).
In the rest of this section, we recalibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy
to provide a numerical analysis on the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination. Here we present
results for di¤erent values of the upper bound  = f4; 8; 12g. The calibrated parameter and
variable values are summarized in Table 2. As for social welfare, the steady-state welfare
function is the same as (27). The initial level of consumption c0 is revised as follows in the
presence of the upper bound :
c0 =
8<:1  1  (1 + ) ~
241 +  ~

!(1+)=359=;
24 1  
~ (e)1 (
~=)
1=
35(1 )=     ~ 1=: (35)
Table 2: Calibration ( = 0:21)
Targets r wL=Y g  
0.053 0.590 0.003 0.338 0.025
Parameters      i
4 0.050 0.590 0.0012 1.145 0.078
8 0.050 0.590 0.0013 1.126 0.078
12 0.050 0.590 0.0013 1.125 0.078
Under an upper bound of  = 12, we nd that economic growth is an inverted-U function
of ination and the growth-maximizing ination rate is about 2.7%, which corresponds to the
21We focus on the case with ~t <  because it can be shown that ~t   does not hold in equilibrium.
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empirical estimate in López-Villavicencio and Mignon (2011). This result is shown in Figure
3a. We also consider an upper bound of  = 8, under which the growth e¤ect of ination
continues to be an inverted-U function. In Figure 4a, we see that the growth-maximizing
ination rate is lower at 1.2%. As for the case of  = 4, the result is shown in Figure 5a.
Figure 5a indicates that the relationship between economic growth and ination becomes
monotonically negative in this case. Therefore, we need a su¢ ciently large upper bound 
to generate an inverted-U relationship between ination and growth. According to the data
in Barsky et al. (2003), an upper bound of 8 to 12 on the markup is not unreasonable given
that some products do charge quite a sizable markup.22 Finally, we also present the welfare
e¤ects of ination in Figures 3b, 4b and 5b and nd that they are all positive over a wide
range of parameter values. These results show that despite the presence of an upper bound
on prices, social welfare is still increasing in ination.
Figure 3a: Ination and economic growth
( = 12)
Figure 3b: Ination and social welfare
( = 12)
Figure 4a: Ination and economic growth
( = 8)
Figure 4b: Ination and social welfare
( = 8)
22Furthermore, it is well known that markups in the pharmaceutical industry, which is an important
innovative sector, are very high.
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Figure 5a: Ination and economic growth
( = 4)
Figure 5b: Ination and social welfare
( = 4)
4.2 Elastic labor supply and CIA constraint on consumption
For simplicity, we now relax the upper bound on prices to  ! 1 as in the benchmark
model. In this section, we explore the general case with elastic labor supply and impose a
CIA constraint on consumption in addition to the CIA constraint on R&D. To consider this
case, we generalize the utility function to
U =
Z 1
0
e t[ln ct +  ln(1  lt)]dt,
where lt is the supply of labor and  determines the disutility of labor supply. Furthermore,
we generalize the CIA constraint to bt + ct  mt, where  2 [0; 1] measures the strength of
the CIA constraint on consumption.
From standard dynamic optimization, the optimality condition for labor supply is
wt(1  lt) = ct(1 +  it), (36)
where it = rt+t. From the prot maximization of nal-good rms, the conditional demand
functions for labor and intermediate goods are respectively23
wt = Yt=lt, (37)
Kt = lt [(1  )Qt=Pt]1= . (38)
Using (38), we express the aggregate production function of nal good as
Yt = lt

1  
~e
(1 )=
Q
(1 )=
t . (39)
23It is helpful to note that we set Lt = lt so that the production function of nal good becomes Yt = ltK
1 
t .
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Combining (24), (25) and (39), the  condition in (26) can be revised as follows:
 =
~
 1=
1 + i

1 + 
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
l   ~1=, (40)
whereas the ~ condition in (25) remains unchanged.
We substitute (37) into (36) to derive Y (1  l)=l = (1+ i)c. Combining this condition
with the resource constraint Y = c+Xm +Xr +Xe and (39), we obtain


1  
~e
(1 )=
(1  l) =  (1 +  i)
(
1  1  
(1 + ) ~

1  
~e
(1 )=
l     ~ 1=
)
.
(41)
Therefore, we can solve the three endogenous variables f~; ; lg using (25), (40) and (41).
In the rest of this section, we calibrate the model to aggregate data of the US economy
in order to provide a numerical analysis on the growth and welfare e¤ects of ination. Here
we explore the implications of di¤erent degrees  of the CIA constraint on consumption. We
calibrate the parameter  by setting the supply of labor l to a standard value of 0.33. The
parameter and variable values are summarized in Table 3. As for social welfare, we make
use of an analogous derivation as before to obtain
U =
1


ln c0 +
g

+  ln (1  l)

, (42)
where
c0 =

1  1  
(1 + ) ~

1  
~e
(1 )=
l     ~ 1=. (43)
Table 3: Calibration ( = 0:21)
Targets r wL=Y g  l 
0.053 0.590 0.003 0.338 0.330 0.025
Parameters       i
0.00 0.050 0.590 0.0004 0.371 1.410 0.078
0.05 0.050 0.590 0.0004 0.371 1.405 0.078
0.13 0.050 0.590 0.0004 0.371 1.396 0.078
1.00 0.050 0.590 0.0004 0.371 1.308 0.078
First, we consider the implications of elastic labor supply without the CIA constraint
on consumption (i.e.,  = 0) in Figure 6. In this case, the growth e¤ect becomes positive
because equilibrium labor l is increasing in the nominal interest rate i. The intuition can
be explained as follows. Although the initial level of consumption is increasing in i, the
consumption-output ratio c=Y is decreasing in i, which in turn implies that labor is increasing
in i because equilibrium labor is given by (1  l)=l = c=Y . The increase in l represents an
additional positive e¤ect on the innovation-arrival rate  as (40) shows; therefore, the overall
growth e¤ect of ination becomes positive. Furthermore, the increase in l also represents
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an additional positive e¤ect on the level of output Y0 as (39) shows; therefore, the overall
welfare e¤ect of ination remains positive and becomes quantitatively stronger than before.
Figure 6a: Ination and economic growth
( = 0)
Figure 6b: Ination and social welfare
( = 0)
We now explore the implications of the CIA constraint on consumption. We begin by
considering a small value of  = 0:05 in Figure 7. In this case, the growth e¤ect becomes
negative because equilibrium labor l is now decreasing in the nominal interest rate i. To
see this, when  > 0, equilibrium labor is given by (1   l)=l = (1 +  i)c=Y , where  i
exerts a negative e¤ect on l through the consumption-leisure tradeo¤. The decrease in l
now represents a negative e¤ect on the innovation-arrival rate  as (40) shows; therefore,
the overall growth e¤ect of ination becomes negative. Furthermore, the decrease in l also
represents a negative e¤ect on the level of output Y0 as (39) shows; however, the overall
welfare e¤ect of ination remains positive but becomes quantitatively weaker than before.
Figure 7a: Ination and economic growth
( = 0:05)
Figure 7b: Ination and social welfare
( = 0:05)
We now increase the strength of the CIA constraint on consumption by raising  to 0:13
in Figure 8. In this case, the growth e¤ect of ination continues to be negative but the
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welfare e¤ect of ination becomes an inverted-U function. The reason is that the negative
e¤ect of i on labor l, which in turn exerts a negative e¤ect on output Y0, becomes stronger.
In this case, the welfare e¤ect of ination eventually becomes negative when the ination
rate is su¢ ciently high.
Figure 8a: Ination and economic growth
( = 0:13)
Figure 8b: Ination and social welfare
( = 0:13)
Finally, we consider the maximum strength of the CIA constraint on consumption by
raising  to 1 in Figure 9. In this case, the negative e¤ect of i on labor becomes stronger
and causes the welfare e¤ect of ination to become monotonically negative. Furthermore,
the negative welfare e¤ect of ination becomes very signicant.
Figure 9a: Ination and economic growth
( = 1)
Figure 9b: Ination and social welfare
( = 1)
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have developed a monetary Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous
entry of rms and random quality improvements. Given this monetary growth-theoretic
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framework, we explore the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth and nd that
ination could have an inverted-U e¤ect on economic growth. Furthermore, we calibrate the
model to aggregate data of the US economy to provide a quantitative investigation. Under
our benchmark parameter values, we nd that the growth-maximizing ination rate is about
2.9%, which is consistent with recent empirical estimates. However, given that we have a
stylized model, the quantitative analysis should be viewed as an illustrative exercise. We
have also explored the welfare e¤ects of ination and considered a number of extensions to
the benchmark model.
In this study, we have sidestepped the issue of scale e¤ects by normalizing the supply of
labor to unity in the case of inelastic labor supply. As for the case of elastic labor supply,
the scale of the economy becomes endogenous and exerts an inuence on the relationship
between ination and growth. One can remove scale e¤ects by endogenizing the market
structure of the economy as in Chu and Ji (2016) and Huang et al. (2015), whose models are
in turn based on the second-generation Schumpeterian model in Peretto (1998, 2007). Chu
and Ji (2016) show that the growth e¤ect of the nominal interest rate via the CIA constraint
on consumption disappears under endogenous market structure because the market structure
endogenously responds to the scale of the economy, measured by equilibrium labor, through
which the nominal interest rate a¤ects economic growth. Huang et al. (2015) show that the
growth e¤ect of the nominal interest rate via the CIA constraint on R&D continues to be
present under endogenous market structure because the nominal interest rate directly a¤ects
the incentives for R&D (rather than through the scale of the economy) as in our benchmark
model with inelastic labor supply. Finally, due to its complexity, we leave the development
of a second-generation Schumpeterian model with random quality improvements to future
research.
6 Acknowledgement
The authors would like to think the Editor (Eric Leeper) and two anonymous Referees
for helpful comments and suggestions. Angus C. Chu gratefully acknowledges the nancial
support from the Thousand Talents Program by the Shanghai Municipal Government. Yuichi
Furukawa acknowledges the partial nancial support of a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists
(B) #26780126 and a Grant-in-Aid for Scientic Research (B) #16H03612.
References
[1] Acemoglu, D., and Akcigit, U., 2012. Intellectual property rights policy, competition
and innovation. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10, 1-42.
[2] Aghion, P., and Howitt, P., 1992. A model of growth through creative destruction,
Econometrica, 60, 323-351.
[3] Arawatari, R., Hori, T., and Mino, K., 2016. On the nonlinear relationship between
ination and growth: A theoretical exposition. KIER Discussion Paper No. 950.
21
[4] Baldwin, R., and Robert-Nicoud, F., 2008. Trade and growth with heterogeneous rms.
Journal of International Economics, 74, 21-34.
[5] Barsky, R., Bergen, M., Dutta, S., and Levy, D., 2003. What can the price gap between
branded and private-label products tell us about markups?. In Scanner Data and Price
Indexes, edited by Feenstra, R., and Shapiro, M., p. 165-228.
[6] Bates, T., Kahle, K., and Stulz, R., 2009. Why do U.S. rms hold so much more cash
than they used to?. Journal of Finance, 64, 1985-2021.
[7] Berentsen, A., Breu, M., and Shi, S., 2012. Liquidity, innovation, and growth. Journal
of Monetary Economics, 59, 721-737.
[8] Bick, A., 2010. Threshold e¤ects of ination on economic growth in developing countries.
Economics Letters, 108, 126-129.
[9] Booth, G., and Ciner, C., 2001. The relationship between nominal interest rates and
ination: International evidence. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 11,
269-280.
[10] Brown, J., and Petersen, B., 2011. Cash holdings and R&D smoothing. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 17, 694-709.
[11] Chu, A., 2010. E¤ects of patent length on R&D: A quantitative DGE analysis. Journal
of Economics, 99, 117-140.
[12] Chu, A., and Cozzi, G., 2014. R&D and economic growth in a cash-in-advance economy.
International Economic Review, 55, 507-524.
[13] Chu, A., Cozzi, G., Lai, C., and Liao, C., 2015. Ination, R&D and growth in an open
economy. Journal of International Economics, 96, 360-374.
[14] Chu, A., and Ji, L., 2016. Monetary policy and endogenous market structure in a
Schumpeterian economy. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 20, 1127-1145.
[15] Chu, A., and Lai, C., 2013. Money and the welfare cost of ination in an R&D growth
model. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 45, 233-249.
[16] Cozzi, G., 2007. The Arrow e¤ect under competitive R&D. B.E. Journal of Macroeco-
nomics (Contributions), 7, Article 2.
[17] Cozzi, G., Giordani, P., and Zamparelli, L., 2007. The refoundation of the symmetric
equilibrium in Schumpeterian growth models. Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 788-
797.
[18] Denicolò, V., and Zanchettin, P., 2010. Competition, market selection and growth.
Economic Journal, 120, 761-785.
[19] Elsby, M., Hobijn, B., and Sahin, A., 2013. The decline of the U.S. labor share. Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper No. 2013-27.
22
[20] Evans, L., Quigley, N., and Zhang, J., 2003. Optimal price regulation in a growth model
with monopolistic suppliers of intermediate goods. Canadian Journal of Economics, 36,
463-474.
[21] Falato, A., and Sim, J., 2014. Why do innovative rms hold so much cash? Evidence
from changes in state R&D tax credits. FEDS Working Paper No. 2014-72.
[22] Fisher, M., and Seater, J., 1993. Long-run neutrality and superneutrality in an ARIMA
framework. American Economic Review, 83, 402-415.
[23] Grossman, G., and Helpman, E., 1991. Quality ladders in the theory of growth. Review
of Economic Studies, 58, 43-61.
[24] Guerrero, F., 2006. Does ination cause poor long-term growth performance?. Japan
and the World Economy, 18, 72-89.
[25] Gustafsson, P., and Segerstrom, P., 2010. Trade liberalization and productivity growth.
Review of International Economics, 18, 207-228.
[26] Hall, B., 1992. Investment and R&D at the rm level: Does the source of nancing
matter?. NBER Working Paper No. 4096.
[27] Haruyama, T., and Zhao, L., 2008. Trade and rm heterogeneity in a quality-ladder
model of growth. Kobe University Discussion Paper No. 223.
[28] He, Q., and Zou, H., 2016. Does ination cause growth in the reform-era China? Theory
and evidence. International Review of Economics & Finance, 45, 470-484.
[29] Hori, T., 2017. Monetary policy, nancial frictions, and heterogeneous R&D rm in an
endogenous growth model. Manuscript.
[30] Huang, C., Chang, J., and Ji, L., 2015. Ination, market structure, and innovation-
driven growth with various cash constraints. Manuscript.
[31] Huang, C., Yang, Y., and Cheng, C., 2017. The growth and welfare analysis of patent
and monetary policies in a Schumpeterian economy. International Review of Economics
& Finance, forthcoming.
[32] Iwaisako, T., and Ohki, K., 2017. Innovation by heterogeneous leaders. Osaka University
Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 15-30.
[33] López-Villavicencio, A., and Mignon, V., 2011. On the impact of ination on output
growth: Does the level of ination matter?. Journal of Macroeconomics, 33, 455-464.
[34] Marquis, M., and Re¤ett, K., 1994. New technology spillovers into the payment system.
Economic Journal, 104, 1123-1138.
[35] Melitz, M., 2003. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate
industry productivity. Econometrica, 71, 1695-1725.
23
[36] Minniti, A., Parello, C., and Segerstrom, P., 2013. A Schumpeterian growth model with
random quality improvements. Economic Theory, 52, 755-791.
[37] Mishkin, F., 1992. Is the Fisher e¤ect for real? A reexamination of the relationship
between ination and interest rates. Journal of Monetary Economics, 30, 195-215.
[38] Neto, A., Furukawa, Y., and Ribeiro, A., 2017. Can trade unions increase social welfare?
An R&D model with cash-in-advance constraints. MPRA Paper No. 77312.
[39] Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R., and Williamson, R., 1999. The determinants and
implications of corporate cash holdings. Journal of Financial Economics, 52, 3-46.
[40] Peretto, P., 1998. Technological change and population growth. Journal of Economic
Growth, 3, 283-311.
[41] Peretto, P., 2007. Corporate taxes, growth and welfare in a Schumpeterian economy.
Journal of Economic Theory, 137, 353-382.
[42] Romer, P., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98,
S71-S102.
[43] Segerstrom, P., 1998. Endogenous growth without scale e¤ects. American Economic
Review, 88, 1290-1310.
[44] Segerstrom, P., Anant, T.C.A. and Dinopoulos, E., 1990. A Schumpeterian model of
the product life cycle. American Economic Review, 80, 1077-91.
[45] Vaona, A., 2012. Ination and growth in the long run: A new Keynesian theory and
further semiparametric evidence. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 16, 94-132.
24
Appendix A: The stationary quality threshold
In the symmetric equilibrium vet (!; j! + 1)  vet , the ex-ante value of an innovation is
given by
vet =
Z ~t
1
0  f()d+
Z 1
~t
[vt()  t]f()d =
Z 1
~t
vt()f()d  Pr(  ~t)t. (A1)
Substituting the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-post innovation value rtvt () = t () +
_vt ()  Pr(  ~t)tvt () into (A1) yields
rtv
e
t = 
e
t+
Z 1
~t
_vt()f()d Pr(  ~t)t
Z 1
~t
[vt()  t] f()d 
h
Pr(  ~t)t + rt
i
Pr(  ~t)t.
(A2)
Combining (A1) and the R&D condition (11) and also using (14), we obtainZ 1
~t
vt()f()d = (1 + it)t + ~
 1=
t t, (A3)
where it is chosen exogenously by the monetary authority. Di¤erentiating (A3) with respect
to t, we use the Leibniz integral rule to deriveZ 1
~t
_vt()f()d  vt(~t)f(~t)

~t = (1 + i) _t + ~
 1=
t
_t  
1

~
  1+

t

~tt. (A4)
We substitute (12) and the entry condition vt(~t) = t into (A4) to obtainZ 1
~t
_vt()f()d = (1 + i) _t + ~
 1=
t
_t: (A5)
Substituting (A5) into (A2), the ex-ante no-arbitrage condition for an innovation can be
expressed as
rt =
et +
h
_vet +
~
 1=
t
_t
i
  ~ 1=t t
h
vet +
~
 1=
t t
i
vet + ~
 1=
t t
, (A6)
which uses (14) and the R&D condition (11) again. Moreover, we make use of the R&D
condition (11), t = Q
(1 )=
t and t = Q
(1 )=
t to derive
_vet +
~
 1=
t
_t
vet + ~
 1=
t t
=

1  

 _Qt
Qt
.
With this expression, (A6) becomes
rt =
et
vet + ~
 1=
t t
+

1  

 _Qt
Qt
  ~ 1=t t. (A7)
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Meanwhile, the no-arbitrage condition for the ex-post value of the innovation with threshold
quality (i.e.,  = ~t) can be written as
rt =
t(~t)
vt(~t)
+

1  

 _Qt
Qt
  ~ 1=t t. (A8)
By the R&D condition (11), the entry condition vt(~t) = t, t = Q
(1 )=
t and t =
Q
(1 )=
t , (A7) and (A8) imply
et
(1 + i) + ~
 1=
t 
=
t(~t)

. (A9)
Given (16) and (18), (A9) can be rearranged as
(~t   1)~1=t =
1
1 + i



1 + 
. (A10)
Equation (A10) shows that ~t is always stationary.
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Using (8), we can express the aggregate price index of intermediate
goods as24
Pt = exp
Z 1
0
lnt(!)d!

= exp
Z 1
~
(ln) ~f()d

= ~e, (B1)
where ~f() is dened as
~f()  f()R1
~
f()d
= ~
1
f(). (B2)
Here we introduce a modied density function ~f() in summing  on [~;1] because the
distribution of  in equilibrium is not on the original domain [1;1), but instead on [~;1),
due to endogenous entry. Note that
R1
~
~f()d = 1. By (7) and (B1), we obtain Kt =h
(1  )Qt=(~e)
i1=
. Incorporating this condition into the production function Yt = LtK
1 
t ,
we obtain
Yt =

(1  )Qt
~e
(1 )=
, (B3)
noting Lt = 1. Recall that nal goods are used for consumption, production of intermediate
goods, R&D and entry. Consumption is given by ct. By (6) and (8), the amount of nal
goods used for the production of intermediate goods is
Xmt =
Z 1
0
yt(!; j!)d! =
Z 1
0
(1  )Yt
t(!)
d! = (1  )Yt
Z 1
~
1

~f()d =
(1  )Yt
(1 + ) ~
. (B4)
Final goods for innovation and entry are given by
Xrt =
Z 1
0
Rt(!)d! = tt and X
e
t =
Z
!2
t
td! = t~
 1=
t, (B5)
where 
t is the set of industries in which innovations take place and are implemented at
date t. Finally, we substitute (B3), (B4) and (B5) into the market-clearing condition Yt =
ct +X
m
t +X
r
t +X
e
t to derive
t =
1
 + ~
 1=
"
1  
~e
(1 )= 
1  1  
(1 + ) ~

  Ct
#
, (B6)
where Ct  ct=Q(1 )=t is a transformed variable that is stationary. We substitute (16) and
the R&D condition (11) into (A7) to derive
rt =
(1  )Yt
(1 + i)t + ~
 1=
t
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
1+

#
  ~ 1=t +
1  

_Qt
Qt
. (B7)
24We achieve this by applying integration by parts toZ 1
~
(ln) ~f()d =
~
1=

Z 1
~
(ln)
 
d
d
1 
1+

1  1+
!
d:
27
Finally, substituting (B3) and (B7) into (3) yields
_Ct
Ct
= rt    1  

_Qt
Qt
=
(1  )1=
[(1 + i) + ~
 1=
]e(1 )=
"
~  1=(1 + )
~
(1=)+(1=)
#
  ~ 1=t  , (B8)
noting the denitions Ct  ct=Q(1 )=t and t  Q(1 )=t . Substituting (B6) into (B8), we
have an one-dimensional di¤erential equation in Ct.25 Given that t decreases with Ct in
(B6), the right-hand side of (B8) is increasing in Ct, so the dynamics of Ct is characterized
by saddle-point stability, such that Ct must jump to its interior steady-state value. Given a
stationary value of Ct, (B6) implies that t is also stationary.
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proof, we rst show that the relationship between i and
~
 1=
 is either inverted U-shaped or negative. Combining (25) and (26), we have
~
 1=
 =
(1  )1=
e(1 )=
 
~  1
~
1=
!
  : (B9)
By di¤erentiating the right-hand side of (B9) with respect to ~; we can easily show that
d(~
 1=
)=d~ > (<) 0 if ~ < (>) 1=(1   ), implying an inverted-U relationship between
~ and ~
 1=
: In identifying the relationship with respect to i; we naturally focus on a
non-trivial range of ~; i.e., (; ); where ~
 1=
 > 0 holds.26 Given that ~ monotonically
decreases with i (Lemma 3), i  0 provides another natural upper bound of ~, say i; which
is dened by
(i   1)1=i =



1 + 
: (B10)
When i is large enough (exceeding 1=(1   )), the relationship between i and ~ 1= is
inverted U-shaped on the non-trivial range (; i); see Figure 10a. When i is small enough
(falling below 1=(1  )), ~ 1= is monotonically decreasing in i on (; i); see Figure 10b.
Note that, by (B10), i increases with  and, by (B9),  decreases with : This implies that
for a larger (smaller) entry cost , accompanied by a larger (smaller) i; the relationship
between i and ~
 1=
 becomes inverted-U (negative).
25Although e is an endogenous variable, it is stationary and a function of parameters as shown in (A10).
26The formal denition of (; ) is given by incorporating ~
 1=
 = 0 into (B9):  and  are equal to x
such that (x  1) =x1= = e(1 )==(1  )1=: This has the two solutions such as x =  and  if and only
if  <  (1  ) 2  =e(1 )=: Otherwise, ~ 1= cannot be positive.
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In the rest of this proof, we characterize the relationship between i and g. For ~ <
1=(1  ); it holds d(~ 1=)=d~ > 0 as shown above. Given that (ln ~+) is also increasing
in ~; this implies dg=d~ > 0 for ~ < 1=(1   ); by noting (21). To see the case where
1=(1  ) < ~; using (21) and (B9), we can obtain
dg
d~
=
1  
~
1+1=
8>>><>>>:

(1  )1=
e(1 )=

~  1

  ~1=

| {z }
(~): uni-modal and concave in ~
  (ln ~+ )(1  )
1=
e(1 )=
1  


~  1
1  

| {z }
(~): increasing and convex in ~
9>>>=>>>; :
Note the following properties: (a) (1=(1   )) > 0 and (1=(1   )) = 0; (b) (~) is an
uni-modal function27 and (~) is a strictly increasing function; (c) () = () = 0; and (d)
(~) is strictly concave and (~) is strictly convex.
Using these properties, we can graphically show that (~) intersects (~) from below only
once at some point in ~ 2 (1=(1  ); ), below (above) which dg=d~ > (<) 0. This implies
an inverted-U relation between ~ and g on (; ). The rest of Proposition 1 straightforwardly
follows, noting that i is increasing in .
27It is useful to note that (~) is upward sloping at ~ = 1=(1  ).
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Appendix C: Not for publication
Equation (20): Recall that the equilibrium distribution of  is given by ~f(); which is
dened by (B2) in Appendix B. Then we calculateZ 1
0
ln(!)d! =
Z 1
~
(ln) ~f()d =
~
1=

Z 1
~
(ln) 
1+
 d,
where the second equality uses (12) and (B2). Given that
 
1+
 =
d
d
1 
1+

1  1+

,
we have Z 1
0
ln(!)d! =
~
1=

Z 1
~
(ln)
"
d
d
 
1 
1+

1  1+

!#
d.
Applying integration by parts, we calculate
~
1=

Z 1
~
(ln)
"
d
d
 
1 
1+

1  1+

!#
d =
~
1=

( 1 
1+

1  1+

ln

1
~
 
Z 1
~
 
1+

1  1+

d
)
:
From  1 
1+

1  1+

ln

1
~
= ~
  1
 ln ~ and
Z 1
~
 
1+

1  1+

d =  2~ 
1
 ;
we have
R 1
0
ln(!)d! = ln ~+ .
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